The Washington Post
Published on: Friday, 12/27/2002, A section,
edition, zone, A01
Dateline: UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 26
Inches: 37 Words: 1407 Slug:
U.S. Courted Top Iraqi Official for Defection Iraq Says Nuclear Arms Pioneer Declined Offer
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 26 -- When a senior Iraqi delegation arrived in New York on May 1 to finish plans for the resumption of U.N. inspections in Iraq, a key member of the team was missing. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, widely regarded as the father of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program, had been held up by American officials at the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan, and questioned for several hours before he was given a visa.
The British-trained physicist had been "singled out for interrogation" by U.S. officials in Jordan and would not be arriving until the following day, said Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri in the opening meeting with a U.N. delegation. Iraqi diplomats subsequently told U.N. officials that U.S. officials also offered money to Jaffar and other Iraqi officials in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade them to defect, according to Iraqi and Western diplomats.
The disclosure suggests that Washington may have already begun an aggressive campaign to identify key Iraqi officials for defection several months before U.N. inspectors arrived in Iraq to question Iraq's weapons experts. In recent weeks, the United States has stepped up efforts to encourage new defections, demanding that weapons inspectors invite Iraqi scientists for interviews abroad, where they will be provided with an opportunity to request political asylum.
Information about the alleged defection effort in May came originally from Iraqi officials, who have a stake in portraying the United States as a disruptive force in the inspections process. Still, the Iraqis complained about it at the time -- before the issue became so highly charged -- and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan took the claims seriously enough to change the venue of the next round of talks to Vienna.
While the Iraqi claims that the United States had targeted several officials for defection have been generally known, until now their names were unpublicized. In addition to Jaffar, the diplomatic sources said, the Americans also targeted Gen. Amir Saadi, a senior adviser to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein who was also instrumental in developing Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.
The third individual was Mehdi Labidi, a midlevel technical expert, according to a report Tuesday by the London-based Arab language newspaper Asharq al-Awsat. The newspaper, citing Iraqi officials as sources, reported that U.S. intelligence agents had repeatedly phoned Iraqi officials at their hotels in New York and sought to lure them into defecting with a case filled with cash.
A Bush administration official declined to comment, saying, "We don't comment on intelligence matters." A CIA spokesman declined comment.
The Bush administration, which succeeded in persuading two Iraqi diplomats at Baghdad's U.N. mission to defect in the summer of 2001, has argued that well-placed defectors are the key to unearthing fresh insights into Iraq's secret weapons program. The CIA has a program aimed at encouraging such defections.
But Hans Blix, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, has expressed concern about the United Nations running a defector program. He has said that the United States has yet to come up with ideas for how the international organization can select Iraqi scientists and their families, and take them out of the country for interviews.
The defection of Jaffar would have constituted the most significant intelligence coup on Iraq's weapons program since Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, who headed Iraq's secret weapons program, fled Iraq in 1995, prompting the government to hand over millions of pages of secret documents related to its banned weapons program. A former deputy to Hussein Kamel, Jaffar had been at the center of Iraq's secret effort to develop nuclear weapons for more than 20 years. A trusted member of Hussein's inner circle, Jaffar would have likely been a pivotal figure in any recent efforts to restart the program.
"He's extremely significant. He knows more than anybody else, because he is trusted by the top level and he was very involved in all the different programs" in the nuclear field, said David Albright, a former U.N. nuclear weapons inspector who heads the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). "He also should have known about all the chemical, biological and missile programs."
The May episode led to an appeal from the Iraqi government to Annan to hold future meetings on weapons inspections in Geneva or Vienna. But the Iraqi government did not go public with the outlines of the story until June, after Washington ordered the expulsion of an Iraqi diplomat in New York -- Abdul Rahman Saad -- on the grounds that he was recruiting U.S. citizens to spy for Iraq.
Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Douri, told reporters that Washington was simply retaliating because Baghdad had lodged a complaint with the United Nations over U.S. "harassment" of three members of the Iraqi delegation, whom he declined to identify. "This is vengeance," Douri told the Associated Press in June. "They have been asked to stay in the United States -- to defect."
Albright said that Jaffar would have been a natural target for U.S. intelligence agents. A member of Iraq's former royal ruling class, Jaffar was imprisoned and tortured by Hussein until he agreed in the early 1980s to help build the Arab world's first nuclear bomb. But Jaffar also prospered under the regime, increasing his wealth and rising to the post of minister without a portfolio.
"Here's a guy who they tortured to force him to work in the program. I don't see him having a tremendous loyalty to them if he had a choice," Albright said. But "it may be that he is so intertwined financially with the regime, so he has in a sense no way out."
Khidhir Hamza, a former aide to Jaffar who defected to the United States, said that the United States and the United Nations are potentially endangering the lives of Iraqi scientists. Jaffar's flight would have placed his family in peril. The Iraqi regime had responded to previous acts of betrayal mercilessly. After luring Hussein Kamel back to Baghdad, he was gunned down outside his home along with other family members.
Hamza said the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to conduct an initial round of interviews with Iraqi scientists in Iraq before narrowing a list of key figures for questioning abroad is particularly dangerous. "Talking to scientists with minders is meaningless; without minders it is an endangerment," he said. "The mere fact that [an individual] is interviewed and chosen will tell the Iraqi government that he is ready to cooperate, and that could endanger him and his family."
That fear has already had a chilling effect on the interviews. One Iraqi scientist, Sabah Abdel-Nour, who participated in Iraq's previous nuclear energy program, told the French press agency that he declined to be interviewed without the presence of an Iraqi official. "The inspectors asked me for a personal interview and proposed that it be in private," he said. "I apologized and asked for the presence of a member of the National Monitoring Directorate."
If Jaffar had any intention of betraying the Iraqi regime, it was anything but evident when he finally arrived in New York for an afternoon meeting with U.N. nuclear experts on May 2. Jaffar complained that his luggage was missing and that he was wearing the same outfit as when he left Baghdad. "He said the [U.S. intelligence] agencies are probably going through every single piece of clothing," according to a U.N. official.
Jaffar then began a tirade, saying the United Nations falsified reports on Iraq's efforts to dismantle its nuclear weapons. "He went ballistic," the official said. "Some people in the meeting thought that he was probably being aggressive with us to show his own government that he had no intention of defecting."
At one point, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, threatened to stop the discussions when Jaffar insulted ElBaradei's chief aide, Jacques Baute, the French head of the IAEA's Iraq action team, criticizing his command of English. One U.N. official said Jaffar said, " 'My English is much better than yours, Baute, so don't come play with words in English. Though I must admit that since you married a British national, your English is improving.' "
Thursday, May 14, 2009
US Approves Sale of Nerve Agent Antidote to Saddam
The Washington Post
Published on: Thursday, 12/12/2002, A section,
edition, zone, A01
Dateline: UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11
Inches: 26 Words: 990 Slug:
U.S. Approved Sale of Atropine Iraq Imported Millions of Doses Of Antidote for Nerve Agents
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11 -- With U.S. approval, Iraq imported more than 3.5 million vials of the drug atropine over the past five years, despite concerns that it could be used to inoculate Iraqi soldiers participating in chemical warfare, according to U.N. sources and confidential U.N. documents.
Between late 1997 and November 2001, French, Russian and Italian companies signed at least five contracts through the U.N. oil-for-food program to sell Iraq more than 3.5 million ampuls of the nerve agent antidote, which is also used to treat heart attacks. More than 2 million units of the drug have already been delivered to Baghdad, U.N. sources said. The rest is awaiting delivery.
The disclosure comes as the United States is struggling to convince the U.N. Security Council to place new restrictions on the sale of the drug because of Pentagon concerns that the Iraqi army may use the drug to protect its soldiers if it mounts a chemical attack against U.S. troops.
On Tuesday, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, listed atropine and the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (also known as Cipro), among 36 categories of items that should be subject to U.N. Security Council scrutiny before they can be shipped to Iraq. In 1999, a Jordanian firm, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co. Ltd., sold Iraq an unknown quantity of Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic that is used to treat exposure to anthrax and a host of other infections, according to U.N. documents.
Until May, the United States had the right to prohibit or monitor sales of atropine to Iraq but rarely exercised it. The United States relinquished its authority as part of a council agreement to ease restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq.
The Pentagon became alarmed about the potential military uses of atropine after discovering that Turkey had been approached by Iraq to supply it with massive quantities of atropine and auto-injectors, which are designed to treat victims of pesticide or nerve agent poisoning. A senior Turkish official said that Ankara is investigating the report, which was first disclosed in the New York Times. Until now, however, it was not known that Iraq had succeeded in buying supplies of atropine or that they were obtained through the U.N.-sanctioned oil-for-food program.
U.N. officials said the quantities of atropine purchased by Iraq were consistent with dosages used for medical purposes. More than 3.4 million vials, the vast majority, contained 0.6-milligram doses of atropine sulfate, an amount typically used to speed up the heart rate of heart attack victims.
Chemical warfare experts said a dose of 2 milligrams is typically administered to victims of nerve agents or pesticide poisoning. On the battlefield, they said, the drug would probably be administered with auto-injectors. U.N. officials said Iraq has never imported auto-injectors through the oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and humanitarian goods.
"The advantage of an auto-injector is that somebody can give one to himself, he can give it to his buddy right there. It doesn't require medical care," said Frederick R. Sidell, a retired U.S. Army expert on chemical warfare. But Sidell said that the lower doses used for heart treatment could be easily converted to military uses if administered with a common needle and syringe. "You just give three times as much. For any casualty who is mildly exposed it might be enough."
The United States has cited the Turkey case to underscore the importance of preventing Iraq from obtaining a host of items that could be used to develop long-range missiles and chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Those items, which are listed in the document Bolton presented council members, include global positioning systems, radio intercept devices, night vision technology and communications jamming equipment.
Asked why the United States had not previously added atropine or auto-injectors to the list of items requiring Security Council review, John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, "I honestly don't know the answer." But he said that the United States has received a commitment from the other council members to consider placing new restrictions on them before the end of the month.
Russia and France have signaled that they are willing to add atropine and some other items to the United Nations' 302-page list of dual-use products that require Security Council scrutiny. But they have made it clear that they want other items taken off the list. Russia, for instance, has proposed easing restrictions on trucks that it sells to Iraq.
A spokeswoman at the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, which overseas all sales to Iraq through the oil-for-food program, declined to name the companies that sold the medicines to Iraq. But confidential U.N. documents and U.N. sources revealed that the Italian company Alfa Intes Industria Terapeutica Splendore signed a contract to sell about 3,000 ampuls of atropine sulfate to Iraq in late 1997.
The French pharmaceutical company Laboratoires Renaudin sold nearly one million ampuls of atropine to Iraq in July 2000. A more recent shipment of 1.5 million ampuls of atropine from French and Russian sources was placed on hold by the United States, but it was then approved under the recent procedures without any plans for monitoring its use. It was approved in October and is awaiting delivery to Iraq.
"If a particular item is not on the goods review list, the contract gets approved," said Ewen Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for reviewing contracts.
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11 -- With U.S. approval, Iraq imported more than 3.5 million vials of the drug atropine over the past five years, despite concerns that it could be used to inoculate Iraqi soldiers participating in chemical warfare, according to U.N. sources and confidential U.N. documents.
Between late 1997 and November 2001, French, Russian and Italian companies signed at least five contracts through the U.N. oil-for-food program to sell Iraq more than 3.5 million ampuls of the nerve agent antidote, which is also used to treat heart attacks. More than 2 million units of the drug have already been delivered to Baghdad, U.N. sources said. The rest is awaiting delivery.
The disclosure comes as the United States is struggling to convince the U.N. Security Council to place new restrictions on the sale of the drug because of Pentagon concerns that the Iraqi army may use the drug to protect its soldiers if it mounts a chemical attack against U.S. troops.
On Tuesday, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, listed atropine and the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (also known as Cipro), among 36 categories of items that should be subject to U.N. Security Council scrutiny before they can be shipped to Iraq. In 1999, a Jordanian firm, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co. Ltd., sold Iraq an unknown quantity of Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic that is used to treat exposure to anthrax and a host of other infections, according to U.N. documents.
Until May, the United States had the right to prohibit or monitor sales of atropine to Iraq but rarely exercised it. The United States relinquished its authority as part of a council agreement to ease restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq.
The Pentagon became alarmed about the potential military uses of atropine after discovering that Turkey had been approached by Iraq to supply it with massive quantities of atropine and auto-injectors, which are designed to treat victims of pesticide or nerve agent poisoning. A senior Turkish official said that Ankara is investigating the report, which was first disclosed in the New York Times. Until now, however, it was not known that Iraq had succeeded in buying supplies of atropine or that they were obtained through the U.N.-sanctioned oil-for-food program.
U.N. officials said the quantities of atropine purchased by Iraq were consistent with dosages used for medical purposes. More than 3.4 million vials, the vast majority, contained 0.6-milligram doses of atropine sulfate, an amount typically used to speed up the heart rate of heart attack victims.
Chemical warfare experts said a dose of 2 milligrams is typically administered to victims of nerve agents or pesticide poisoning. On the battlefield, they said, the drug would probably be administered with auto-injectors. U.N. officials said Iraq has never imported auto-injectors through the oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and humanitarian goods.
"The advantage of an auto-injector is that somebody can give one to himself, he can give it to his buddy right there. It doesn't require medical care," said Frederick R. Sidell, a retired U.S. Army expert on chemical warfare. But Sidell said that the lower doses used for heart treatment could be easily converted to military uses if administered with a common needle and syringe. "You just give three times as much. For any casualty who is mildly exposed it might be enough."
The United States has cited the Turkey case to underscore the importance of preventing Iraq from obtaining a host of items that could be used to develop long-range missiles and chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Those items, which are listed in the document Bolton presented council members, include global positioning systems, radio intercept devices, night vision technology and communications jamming equipment.
Asked why the United States had not previously added atropine or auto-injectors to the list of items requiring Security Council review, John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, "I honestly don't know the answer." But he said that the United States has received a commitment from the other council members to consider placing new restrictions on them before the end of the month.
Russia and France have signaled that they are willing to add atropine and some other items to the United Nations' 302-page list of dual-use products that require Security Council scrutiny. But they have made it clear that they want other items taken off the list. Russia, for instance, has proposed easing restrictions on trucks that it sells to Iraq.
A spokeswoman at the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, which overseas all sales to Iraq through the oil-for-food program, declined to name the companies that sold the medicines to Iraq. But confidential U.N. documents and U.N. sources revealed that the Italian company Alfa Intes Industria Terapeutica Splendore signed a contract to sell about 3,000 ampuls of atropine sulfate to Iraq in late 1997.
The French pharmaceutical company Laboratoires Renaudin sold nearly one million ampuls of atropine to Iraq in July 2000. A more recent shipment of 1.5 million ampuls of atropine from French and Russian sources was placed on hold by the United States, but it was then approved under the recent procedures without any plans for monitoring its use. It was approved in October and is awaiting delivery to Iraq.
"If a particular item is not on the goods review list, the contract gets approved," said Ewen Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for reviewing contracts.
Published on: Thursday, 12/12/2002, A section,
edition, zone, A01
Dateline: UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11
Inches: 26 Words: 990 Slug:
U.S. Approved Sale of Atropine Iraq Imported Millions of Doses Of Antidote for Nerve Agents
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11 -- With U.S. approval, Iraq imported more than 3.5 million vials of the drug atropine over the past five years, despite concerns that it could be used to inoculate Iraqi soldiers participating in chemical warfare, according to U.N. sources and confidential U.N. documents.
Between late 1997 and November 2001, French, Russian and Italian companies signed at least five contracts through the U.N. oil-for-food program to sell Iraq more than 3.5 million ampuls of the nerve agent antidote, which is also used to treat heart attacks. More than 2 million units of the drug have already been delivered to Baghdad, U.N. sources said. The rest is awaiting delivery.
The disclosure comes as the United States is struggling to convince the U.N. Security Council to place new restrictions on the sale of the drug because of Pentagon concerns that the Iraqi army may use the drug to protect its soldiers if it mounts a chemical attack against U.S. troops.
On Tuesday, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, listed atropine and the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (also known as Cipro), among 36 categories of items that should be subject to U.N. Security Council scrutiny before they can be shipped to Iraq. In 1999, a Jordanian firm, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co. Ltd., sold Iraq an unknown quantity of Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic that is used to treat exposure to anthrax and a host of other infections, according to U.N. documents.
Until May, the United States had the right to prohibit or monitor sales of atropine to Iraq but rarely exercised it. The United States relinquished its authority as part of a council agreement to ease restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq.
The Pentagon became alarmed about the potential military uses of atropine after discovering that Turkey had been approached by Iraq to supply it with massive quantities of atropine and auto-injectors, which are designed to treat victims of pesticide or nerve agent poisoning. A senior Turkish official said that Ankara is investigating the report, which was first disclosed in the New York Times. Until now, however, it was not known that Iraq had succeeded in buying supplies of atropine or that they were obtained through the U.N.-sanctioned oil-for-food program.
U.N. officials said the quantities of atropine purchased by Iraq were consistent with dosages used for medical purposes. More than 3.4 million vials, the vast majority, contained 0.6-milligram doses of atropine sulfate, an amount typically used to speed up the heart rate of heart attack victims.
Chemical warfare experts said a dose of 2 milligrams is typically administered to victims of nerve agents or pesticide poisoning. On the battlefield, they said, the drug would probably be administered with auto-injectors. U.N. officials said Iraq has never imported auto-injectors through the oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and humanitarian goods.
"The advantage of an auto-injector is that somebody can give one to himself, he can give it to his buddy right there. It doesn't require medical care," said Frederick R. Sidell, a retired U.S. Army expert on chemical warfare. But Sidell said that the lower doses used for heart treatment could be easily converted to military uses if administered with a common needle and syringe. "You just give three times as much. For any casualty who is mildly exposed it might be enough."
The United States has cited the Turkey case to underscore the importance of preventing Iraq from obtaining a host of items that could be used to develop long-range missiles and chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Those items, which are listed in the document Bolton presented council members, include global positioning systems, radio intercept devices, night vision technology and communications jamming equipment.
Asked why the United States had not previously added atropine or auto-injectors to the list of items requiring Security Council review, John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, "I honestly don't know the answer." But he said that the United States has received a commitment from the other council members to consider placing new restrictions on them before the end of the month.
Russia and France have signaled that they are willing to add atropine and some other items to the United Nations' 302-page list of dual-use products that require Security Council scrutiny. But they have made it clear that they want other items taken off the list. Russia, for instance, has proposed easing restrictions on trucks that it sells to Iraq.
A spokeswoman at the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, which overseas all sales to Iraq through the oil-for-food program, declined to name the companies that sold the medicines to Iraq. But confidential U.N. documents and U.N. sources revealed that the Italian company Alfa Intes Industria Terapeutica Splendore signed a contract to sell about 3,000 ampuls of atropine sulfate to Iraq in late 1997.
The French pharmaceutical company Laboratoires Renaudin sold nearly one million ampuls of atropine to Iraq in July 2000. A more recent shipment of 1.5 million ampuls of atropine from French and Russian sources was placed on hold by the United States, but it was then approved under the recent procedures without any plans for monitoring its use. It was approved in October and is awaiting delivery to Iraq.
"If a particular item is not on the goods review list, the contract gets approved," said Ewen Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for reviewing contracts.
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 11 -- With U.S. approval, Iraq imported more than 3.5 million vials of the drug atropine over the past five years, despite concerns that it could be used to inoculate Iraqi soldiers participating in chemical warfare, according to U.N. sources and confidential U.N. documents.
Between late 1997 and November 2001, French, Russian and Italian companies signed at least five contracts through the U.N. oil-for-food program to sell Iraq more than 3.5 million ampuls of the nerve agent antidote, which is also used to treat heart attacks. More than 2 million units of the drug have already been delivered to Baghdad, U.N. sources said. The rest is awaiting delivery.
The disclosure comes as the United States is struggling to convince the U.N. Security Council to place new restrictions on the sale of the drug because of Pentagon concerns that the Iraqi army may use the drug to protect its soldiers if it mounts a chemical attack against U.S. troops.
On Tuesday, John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, listed atropine and the antibiotic ciprofloxacin (also known as Cipro), among 36 categories of items that should be subject to U.N. Security Council scrutiny before they can be shipped to Iraq. In 1999, a Jordanian firm, Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Co. Ltd., sold Iraq an unknown quantity of Cipro, a broad spectrum antibiotic that is used to treat exposure to anthrax and a host of other infections, according to U.N. documents.
Until May, the United States had the right to prohibit or monitor sales of atropine to Iraq but rarely exercised it. The United States relinquished its authority as part of a council agreement to ease restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq.
The Pentagon became alarmed about the potential military uses of atropine after discovering that Turkey had been approached by Iraq to supply it with massive quantities of atropine and auto-injectors, which are designed to treat victims of pesticide or nerve agent poisoning. A senior Turkish official said that Ankara is investigating the report, which was first disclosed in the New York Times. Until now, however, it was not known that Iraq had succeeded in buying supplies of atropine or that they were obtained through the U.N.-sanctioned oil-for-food program.
U.N. officials said the quantities of atropine purchased by Iraq were consistent with dosages used for medical purposes. More than 3.4 million vials, the vast majority, contained 0.6-milligram doses of atropine sulfate, an amount typically used to speed up the heart rate of heart attack victims.
Chemical warfare experts said a dose of 2 milligrams is typically administered to victims of nerve agents or pesticide poisoning. On the battlefield, they said, the drug would probably be administered with auto-injectors. U.N. officials said Iraq has never imported auto-injectors through the oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and humanitarian goods.
"The advantage of an auto-injector is that somebody can give one to himself, he can give it to his buddy right there. It doesn't require medical care," said Frederick R. Sidell, a retired U.S. Army expert on chemical warfare. But Sidell said that the lower doses used for heart treatment could be easily converted to military uses if administered with a common needle and syringe. "You just give three times as much. For any casualty who is mildly exposed it might be enough."
The United States has cited the Turkey case to underscore the importance of preventing Iraq from obtaining a host of items that could be used to develop long-range missiles and chemical, biological and conventional weapons. Those items, which are listed in the document Bolton presented council members, include global positioning systems, radio intercept devices, night vision technology and communications jamming equipment.
Asked why the United States had not previously added atropine or auto-injectors to the list of items requiring Security Council review, John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, "I honestly don't know the answer." But he said that the United States has received a commitment from the other council members to consider placing new restrictions on them before the end of the month.
Russia and France have signaled that they are willing to add atropine and some other items to the United Nations' 302-page list of dual-use products that require Security Council scrutiny. But they have made it clear that they want other items taken off the list. Russia, for instance, has proposed easing restrictions on trucks that it sells to Iraq.
A spokeswoman at the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, which overseas all sales to Iraq through the oil-for-food program, declined to name the companies that sold the medicines to Iraq. But confidential U.N. documents and U.N. sources revealed that the Italian company Alfa Intes Industria Terapeutica Splendore signed a contract to sell about 3,000 ampuls of atropine sulfate to Iraq in late 1997.
The French pharmaceutical company Laboratoires Renaudin sold nearly one million ampuls of atropine to Iraq in July 2000. A more recent shipment of 1.5 million ampuls of atropine from French and Russian sources was placed on hold by the United States, but it was then approved under the recent procedures without any plans for monitoring its use. It was approved in October and is awaiting delivery to Iraq.
"If a particular item is not on the goods review list, the contract gets approved," said Ewen Buchanan, a spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for reviewing contracts.
US Seeks Broader Control of Iraqi Oil
The Washington Post,
A01
U.S. to Propose Broader Control Of Iraqi Oil, Funds Draft Resolution Also Would End Decade of U.N. Trade Sanctions
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 -- The Bush administration circulated a draft resolution among key Security Council members today calling for the elimination of more than a decade of international sanctions on Iraq and granting the United States broad control over the country's oil industry and revenue until a permanent, representative Iraqi government is in place.
The resolution, which is to be presented to the 15-nation body Friday, would shift control of Iraq's oil from the United Nations to the United States and its military allies, with an international advisory board having oversight responsibilities but little effective power. A transitional Iraqi government, which U.S. authorities have said they hope to establish within weeks, would be granted a consultative role.
The proposal would give the United States far greater authority over Iraq's lucrative oil industry than administration officials have previously acknowledged. Buffeted by charges that the United States was launching a war to gain control over Iraq's oil fields, administration officials have for months sought to assure governments that Iraq's oil revenue would remain in the hands of the Iraqi people after the ouster of president Saddam Hussein.
The U.S. text, which was sponsored by Britain and Spain, could potentially face tough resistance from France and Russia, who favor continued U.N. control over Iraq's oil wealth and are on record opposing any Security Council action that would grant legitimacy to a war that they charge was conducted without explicit U.N. authority.
But U.S. officials have voiced confidence in recent days that the bitterness that divided the Security Council before the war has eased since Hussein's downfall and that the council would support a new resolution that the administration says is crucial to jumpstarting the Iraqi economy and its transition to democratic rule.
The resolution would eliminate all non-military trade sanctions on Iraq, endorse the administration of Iraq by the United States, Britain and other countries that took part in the war, and give its blessing to U.S. efforts to form a transitional government known as an interim Iraqi authority. It would also order U.N. members to deny a haven to Hussein and his top officials and to freeze the assets of members of the former government and their families. The proceeds would be placed in a trust fund controlled by the United States and its military allies.
In an effort to address calls by France, Russia and others for a U.N. role in Iraq's future, the resolution would direct U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to appoint a special representative to work with the United States on relief and reconstruction activities, and on the establishment of a representative government. "The U.N. should play a vital role in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority," the resolution says.
But the United States and its allies would control the political and economic life of Iraq until an internationally recognized Iraqi government emerges. Under the system proposed by the administration, the proceeds of Iraq's oil revenue would be placed in an Iraqi Assistance Fund held by the Central Bank of Iraq, which is being managed by Peter McPherson, a former deputy Treasury secretary and Bank of America executive.
The United States and its allies would have the sole power to spend the money on relief, reconstruction and disarmament and to pay "for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq." The "funds in the Iraqi Assistance Fund shall be disbursed at the direction of the [U.S.-led coalition], in consultation with the Iraqi Interim Authority," the resolution states. It adds that Iraq's oil profits shall remain in the assistance fund "until such time as a new Iraqi government is properly constituted and capable of discharging its responsibilities." According to some estimates, it may take years for such a government to be established.
The fund's expenditures would be subject to oversight by an international advisory board comprising representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. The board would choose a team of accountants to audit the funds.
Although the resolution underscores the right of the United States to administer Iraq and its resources for an initial 12 months, it notes that its authority would be automatically renewed each year until the Security Council decided to end it.
The resolution would leave open the prospect of the United States tapping into Iraq's oil revenue to finance its own costly efforts to disarm Iraq. But U.S. officials indicated that they have no intention of using Iraqi oil money to finance the broader U.S. military campaign that led to the fall of the Iraqi government.
The scope and duration of U.S. control over Iraq's oil outlined in the draft resolution goes well beyond previous administration statements, which largely have been confined to affirmations that the oil was the property of the Iraqi people. Testifying on Capitol Hill in March, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "The oil of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq. It's the source of revenue to run the country."
The resolution attempts to satisfy Russian concerns that contracts it signed with Iraq through the U.N. oil-for-food program, under which Iraq was able to sell oil to pay for food, medicine and other humanitarian goods, be honored. It would allow the U.N. humanitarian operation to be phased out over four months, ensuring that about $10 billion in goods and equipment could be shipped to Iraq before the program closes its doors.
The U.S. effort in the Security Council is aimed at encouraging foreign countries to help finance the reconstruction of Iraq. John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, urged the international body today to adopt it by June 3, when a U.N. mandate authorizing the export of Iraqi oil expires.
"We're certainly hopeful that everybody is going to enter into this discussion in a constructive and forward-looking spirit so that we can get on with the question of freeing the Iraqi economy, helping them take steps towards the establishment of a democratic political system, and so that the process of reconstruction of that country can get launched," Negroponte said.
The resolution makes no reference to a U.N. role in certifying Iraq's weapons inspections, a proposal that France and Russia have pressed. "The coalition has taken over the process of inspecting in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction," the text says, adding that it does not envision any role for the U.N. weapons inspection agency "for the foreseeable future."
A01
U.S. to Propose Broader Control Of Iraqi Oil, Funds Draft Resolution Also Would End Decade of U.N. Trade Sanctions
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 -- The Bush administration circulated a draft resolution among key Security Council members today calling for the elimination of more than a decade of international sanctions on Iraq and granting the United States broad control over the country's oil industry and revenue until a permanent, representative Iraqi government is in place.
The resolution, which is to be presented to the 15-nation body Friday, would shift control of Iraq's oil from the United Nations to the United States and its military allies, with an international advisory board having oversight responsibilities but little effective power. A transitional Iraqi government, which U.S. authorities have said they hope to establish within weeks, would be granted a consultative role.
The proposal would give the United States far greater authority over Iraq's lucrative oil industry than administration officials have previously acknowledged. Buffeted by charges that the United States was launching a war to gain control over Iraq's oil fields, administration officials have for months sought to assure governments that Iraq's oil revenue would remain in the hands of the Iraqi people after the ouster of president Saddam Hussein.
The U.S. text, which was sponsored by Britain and Spain, could potentially face tough resistance from France and Russia, who favor continued U.N. control over Iraq's oil wealth and are on record opposing any Security Council action that would grant legitimacy to a war that they charge was conducted without explicit U.N. authority.
But U.S. officials have voiced confidence in recent days that the bitterness that divided the Security Council before the war has eased since Hussein's downfall and that the council would support a new resolution that the administration says is crucial to jumpstarting the Iraqi economy and its transition to democratic rule.
The resolution would eliminate all non-military trade sanctions on Iraq, endorse the administration of Iraq by the United States, Britain and other countries that took part in the war, and give its blessing to U.S. efforts to form a transitional government known as an interim Iraqi authority. It would also order U.N. members to deny a haven to Hussein and his top officials and to freeze the assets of members of the former government and their families. The proceeds would be placed in a trust fund controlled by the United States and its military allies.
In an effort to address calls by France, Russia and others for a U.N. role in Iraq's future, the resolution would direct U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to appoint a special representative to work with the United States on relief and reconstruction activities, and on the establishment of a representative government. "The U.N. should play a vital role in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority," the resolution says.
But the United States and its allies would control the political and economic life of Iraq until an internationally recognized Iraqi government emerges. Under the system proposed by the administration, the proceeds of Iraq's oil revenue would be placed in an Iraqi Assistance Fund held by the Central Bank of Iraq, which is being managed by Peter McPherson, a former deputy Treasury secretary and Bank of America executive.
The United States and its allies would have the sole power to spend the money on relief, reconstruction and disarmament and to pay "for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq." The "funds in the Iraqi Assistance Fund shall be disbursed at the direction of the [U.S.-led coalition], in consultation with the Iraqi Interim Authority," the resolution states. It adds that Iraq's oil profits shall remain in the assistance fund "until such time as a new Iraqi government is properly constituted and capable of discharging its responsibilities." According to some estimates, it may take years for such a government to be established.
The fund's expenditures would be subject to oversight by an international advisory board comprising representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. The board would choose a team of accountants to audit the funds.
Although the resolution underscores the right of the United States to administer Iraq and its resources for an initial 12 months, it notes that its authority would be automatically renewed each year until the Security Council decided to end it.
The resolution would leave open the prospect of the United States tapping into Iraq's oil revenue to finance its own costly efforts to disarm Iraq. But U.S. officials indicated that they have no intention of using Iraqi oil money to finance the broader U.S. military campaign that led to the fall of the Iraqi government.
The scope and duration of U.S. control over Iraq's oil outlined in the draft resolution goes well beyond previous administration statements, which largely have been confined to affirmations that the oil was the property of the Iraqi people. Testifying on Capitol Hill in March, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "The oil of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq. It's the source of revenue to run the country."
The resolution attempts to satisfy Russian concerns that contracts it signed with Iraq through the U.N. oil-for-food program, under which Iraq was able to sell oil to pay for food, medicine and other humanitarian goods, be honored. It would allow the U.N. humanitarian operation to be phased out over four months, ensuring that about $10 billion in goods and equipment could be shipped to Iraq before the program closes its doors.
The U.S. effort in the Security Council is aimed at encouraging foreign countries to help finance the reconstruction of Iraq. John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, urged the international body today to adopt it by June 3, when a U.N. mandate authorizing the export of Iraqi oil expires.
"We're certainly hopeful that everybody is going to enter into this discussion in a constructive and forward-looking spirit so that we can get on with the question of freeing the Iraqi economy, helping them take steps towards the establishment of a democratic political system, and so that the process of reconstruction of that country can get launched," Negroponte said.
The resolution makes no reference to a U.N. role in certifying Iraq's weapons inspections, a proposal that France and Russia have pressed. "The coalition has taken over the process of inspecting in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction," the text says, adding that it does not envision any role for the U.N. weapons inspection agency "for the foreseeable future."
Hans Blix Finds No Smoking Guns in Iraq
The Washington Post
A01, Jan. 10, 2003
No 'Smoking Guns' So Far, U.N. Is Told Blix Says Iraq Failed to Provide Enough Data
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 9 -- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said today that his investigators had uncovered no "smoking gun" evidence that Iraq has resumed its secret weapons programs, but he sharply criticized Baghdad for failing to adequately respond to questions about its previous arms programs or to supply a comprehensive list of Iraqi scientists engaged in weapons activities.
Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Security Council in a closed meeting today that it will be impossible to give Iraq a clean bill of health unless it backs up its claim to have eliminated any previous programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
But the two men also urged the council to be patient, noting that it could be months before they can provide a definitive conclusion about whether Iraq has restarted its weapons programs. "We have now been there for some two months and been covering the country in ever wider sweeps and we haven't found any smoking guns," Blix told reporters before briefing the council. "We think that the declaration failed to answer a great many questions."
The inability of the United Nations to obtain definitive evidence of new weapons activities in Iraq is complicating U.S. efforts to galvanize international support for the military overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Germany's U.N. ambassador, Gunter Pleuger, reflecting a widely shared view among the 15-nation council, said there were still "no grounds for military action" and that inspections should be given more time to succeed. A leading British newspaper reported that Britain is seeking to persuade Washington to delay the onset of a war with Iraq until the fall.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, echoing remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, said today that Blix and ElBaradei will not be able to provide the council with a conclusive review of Iraq's efforts involving banned weapons by the time they are scheduled to present their first comprehensive assessment of those activities on Jan. 27. "We are just in the middle of the process," Blair said. Some senior U.S. officials had viewed the Jan. 27 presentation as a potential trigger for military action.
But Powell has played down the importance of the Jan. 27 assessment, saying Wednesday that "it is not necessarily a D-day for decision-making." Powell said that the United States could still make a case for military action against Iraq even if Blix fails to find hard evidence of arms violations. "You don't really have to have a smoking gun," he told NBC today.
"We know for a fact that there are weapons there," added White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. "The problem with guns that are hidden is you can't see their smoke."
Still, the Bush administration seized on Blix's criticism of Iraq, insisting that Baghdad's latest failure to adequately cooperate with the inspectors or admit it possesses weapons of mass destruction constitutes a "further material breach" of its disarmament obligations and strengthens the case for military action.
"There is still no evidence that Iraq has fundamentally changed its approach from one of deception to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming in meeting the council's demand that it disarm," U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte told the council behind closed doors. "Iraq's cooperation with inspections to date has been legalistic and superficial; but it is far short of the genuine cooperation the council had demanded."
Senior Iraqi officials today denied that their lengthy weapons declaration was incomplete. "People who claim there are omissions in the report . . . are not fully acquainted with our voluminous declaration or they lost their way" reading it, Gen. Amir Saadi, Hussein's chief science adviser, said in Baghdad.
Blix indicated that the pace of inspections in Iraq would intensify as the inspectors increase their use of helicopters to conduct unannounced visits, establish a regional office in the southern city of Basra, and introduce reconnaissance planes to conduct high-altitude surveillance over Iraq.
Blix also plans to push Baghdad to make Iraqi scientists available for interviews without the presence of Iraqi authorities. But he insisted he would not "force anybody to go abroad or force them to defect."
The issue of interviews has been a source of friction between the United Nations and the United States, which believes that Iraqi scientists would speak freely only if they are interviewed abroad.
Blix has recently assured the United States that he would "use all of his authority" to elicit pertinent information on Iraq's weapons programs from Iraqi scientists, according to a senior U.S. official.
Although Blix stopped short of assuring Washington that he would exercise his right to conduct interviews abroad, American officials say they are confident he will do so. One U.S. official said that Washington and the United Nations are in the "final stages" of planning to carry out such interviews in Cyprus.
Blix and ElBaradei, who is scheduled to meet with Powell and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice in Washington on Friday, said that they would travel to Baghdad on Jan. 19 and demand that Iraq provide a fuller account of its weapons programs.
"If evidence is not presented which gives a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative," Blix said. "I have not asserted . . . that proscribed items or activities exist in Iraq, but if they do, Iraq should present them and then eliminate them in our presence. There is still time for it."
ElBaradei indicated to the council that he would press the United States to provide him with additional evidence to support U.S. and British allegations that Iraq tried to import uranium from an African supplier in 1991. In an effort to deflect growing criticism that it has failed to provide useful intelligence to the inspectors, Powell told The Washington Post on Wednesday that Washington has increased intelligence-sharing with the U.N. inspectors.
While acknowledging that Iraq has provided inspectors with unfettered access, Blix and ElBaradei delivered an unexpectedly tough account of Iraq's record of cooperation.
ElBaradei said that Iraq had so far failed to provide adequate documentation describing its efforts to design nuclear weapons and centrifuges used in the enrichment of uranium.
He also said that 32 tons of a high explosive, HMX, that can be used to detonate a nuclear explosive, had disappeared from a facility that had been subject to U.N. monitoring until 1998, when the inspectors left Iraq on the eve of a U.S.-British bombing campaign. "Iraq . . . declared that it had blended the . . . 32 tons with sulfur and turned them into 45.6 tons of industrial explosive used mainly to cement plants for mining."
ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation of Iraq's unsuccessful attempts to acquire large quantities of aluminum tubes yielded no evidence to support suspicions by some U.S. and British intelligence analysts that it may have been destined for a secret program to manufacture centrifuges.
"While the matter is still under investigation," ElBaradei told the council, "the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it."
Blix added to the criticism, faulting Iraq for failing to answer questions about its production of chemical and biological weapons in a 12,000-page declaration to the council last month.
He said the declaration "is rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues and practically devoid of new evidence on such issues." Said Blix, "In order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must provide credible evidence."
Blix noted that comparison of Iraq's declaration and its previous statements revealed "several cases of inconsistencies."
He said Iraq provided contradictory information on its VX nerve agent program, further clouding the U.N. effort to understand how far Iraq got in placing the chemical agent in a weapon.
He noted that Baghdad has failed to provide a convincing explanation for Iraq's illegal acquisition of "a relatively large number of missile engines" and other raw material used to produce solid missile fuel.
A01, Jan. 10, 2003
No 'Smoking Guns' So Far, U.N. Is Told Blix Says Iraq Failed to Provide Enough Data
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 9 -- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said today that his investigators had uncovered no "smoking gun" evidence that Iraq has resumed its secret weapons programs, but he sharply criticized Baghdad for failing to adequately respond to questions about its previous arms programs or to supply a comprehensive list of Iraqi scientists engaged in weapons activities.
Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Security Council in a closed meeting today that it will be impossible to give Iraq a clean bill of health unless it backs up its claim to have eliminated any previous programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
But the two men also urged the council to be patient, noting that it could be months before they can provide a definitive conclusion about whether Iraq has restarted its weapons programs. "We have now been there for some two months and been covering the country in ever wider sweeps and we haven't found any smoking guns," Blix told reporters before briefing the council. "We think that the declaration failed to answer a great many questions."
The inability of the United Nations to obtain definitive evidence of new weapons activities in Iraq is complicating U.S. efforts to galvanize international support for the military overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Germany's U.N. ambassador, Gunter Pleuger, reflecting a widely shared view among the 15-nation council, said there were still "no grounds for military action" and that inspections should be given more time to succeed. A leading British newspaper reported that Britain is seeking to persuade Washington to delay the onset of a war with Iraq until the fall.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, echoing remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, said today that Blix and ElBaradei will not be able to provide the council with a conclusive review of Iraq's efforts involving banned weapons by the time they are scheduled to present their first comprehensive assessment of those activities on Jan. 27. "We are just in the middle of the process," Blair said. Some senior U.S. officials had viewed the Jan. 27 presentation as a potential trigger for military action.
But Powell has played down the importance of the Jan. 27 assessment, saying Wednesday that "it is not necessarily a D-day for decision-making." Powell said that the United States could still make a case for military action against Iraq even if Blix fails to find hard evidence of arms violations. "You don't really have to have a smoking gun," he told NBC today.
"We know for a fact that there are weapons there," added White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. "The problem with guns that are hidden is you can't see their smoke."
Still, the Bush administration seized on Blix's criticism of Iraq, insisting that Baghdad's latest failure to adequately cooperate with the inspectors or admit it possesses weapons of mass destruction constitutes a "further material breach" of its disarmament obligations and strengthens the case for military action.
"There is still no evidence that Iraq has fundamentally changed its approach from one of deception to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming in meeting the council's demand that it disarm," U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte told the council behind closed doors. "Iraq's cooperation with inspections to date has been legalistic and superficial; but it is far short of the genuine cooperation the council had demanded."
Senior Iraqi officials today denied that their lengthy weapons declaration was incomplete. "People who claim there are omissions in the report . . . are not fully acquainted with our voluminous declaration or they lost their way" reading it, Gen. Amir Saadi, Hussein's chief science adviser, said in Baghdad.
Blix indicated that the pace of inspections in Iraq would intensify as the inspectors increase their use of helicopters to conduct unannounced visits, establish a regional office in the southern city of Basra, and introduce reconnaissance planes to conduct high-altitude surveillance over Iraq.
Blix also plans to push Baghdad to make Iraqi scientists available for interviews without the presence of Iraqi authorities. But he insisted he would not "force anybody to go abroad or force them to defect."
The issue of interviews has been a source of friction between the United Nations and the United States, which believes that Iraqi scientists would speak freely only if they are interviewed abroad.
Blix has recently assured the United States that he would "use all of his authority" to elicit pertinent information on Iraq's weapons programs from Iraqi scientists, according to a senior U.S. official.
Although Blix stopped short of assuring Washington that he would exercise his right to conduct interviews abroad, American officials say they are confident he will do so. One U.S. official said that Washington and the United Nations are in the "final stages" of planning to carry out such interviews in Cyprus.
Blix and ElBaradei, who is scheduled to meet with Powell and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice in Washington on Friday, said that they would travel to Baghdad on Jan. 19 and demand that Iraq provide a fuller account of its weapons programs.
"If evidence is not presented which gives a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative," Blix said. "I have not asserted . . . that proscribed items or activities exist in Iraq, but if they do, Iraq should present them and then eliminate them in our presence. There is still time for it."
ElBaradei indicated to the council that he would press the United States to provide him with additional evidence to support U.S. and British allegations that Iraq tried to import uranium from an African supplier in 1991. In an effort to deflect growing criticism that it has failed to provide useful intelligence to the inspectors, Powell told The Washington Post on Wednesday that Washington has increased intelligence-sharing with the U.N. inspectors.
While acknowledging that Iraq has provided inspectors with unfettered access, Blix and ElBaradei delivered an unexpectedly tough account of Iraq's record of cooperation.
ElBaradei said that Iraq had so far failed to provide adequate documentation describing its efforts to design nuclear weapons and centrifuges used in the enrichment of uranium.
He also said that 32 tons of a high explosive, HMX, that can be used to detonate a nuclear explosive, had disappeared from a facility that had been subject to U.N. monitoring until 1998, when the inspectors left Iraq on the eve of a U.S.-British bombing campaign. "Iraq . . . declared that it had blended the . . . 32 tons with sulfur and turned them into 45.6 tons of industrial explosive used mainly to cement plants for mining."
ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation of Iraq's unsuccessful attempts to acquire large quantities of aluminum tubes yielded no evidence to support suspicions by some U.S. and British intelligence analysts that it may have been destined for a secret program to manufacture centrifuges.
"While the matter is still under investigation," ElBaradei told the council, "the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it."
Blix added to the criticism, faulting Iraq for failing to answer questions about its production of chemical and biological weapons in a 12,000-page declaration to the council last month.
He said the declaration "is rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues and practically devoid of new evidence on such issues." Said Blix, "In order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must provide credible evidence."
Blix noted that comparison of Iraq's declaration and its previous statements revealed "several cases of inconsistencies."
He said Iraq provided contradictory information on its VX nerve agent program, further clouding the U.N. effort to understand how far Iraq got in placing the chemical agent in a weapon.
He noted that Baghdad has failed to provide a convincing explanation for Iraq's illegal acquisition of "a relatively large number of missile engines" and other raw material used to produce solid missile fuel.
UN Finds No Proof Of Iraqi Nukes
The Washington Post
A13, Jan. 29, 2003
UN Finds No Proof of Nuclear Program IAEA Unable to Verify US Claims
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 28 -- The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said today that two months of inspections in Iraq and interviews with Iraqi officials have yielded no evidence to support Bush administration claims that Iraq is secretly trying to revive its nuclear weapons program.
ElBaradei said in an interview that "systematic" inspections of eight facilities linked by U.S. and British authorities to a possible nuclear weapons program have turned up no proof to support the claims. "I think we have ruled out . . . the buildings," he said. ElBaradei also cast doubts on U.S. claims that Iraq has sought to import uranium and high-strength aluminum tubes destined for a nuclear weapons program.
ElBaradei's remarks, combined with a relatively upbeat assessment of Iraq's cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors, delivered to the U.N. Security Council on Monday, have complicated Bush administration efforts to make a case for military action against Iraq. The remarks also increased pressure on the United States to provide inspection teams with more intelligence regarding Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program.
The administration's concerns about Iraq's alleged intent to develop nuclear weapons formed the basis of the case President Bush made to the United Nations in September for disarming Iraq. Bush said in an Oct. 7 speech that satellite photographs revealed that "Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past." White House officials produced satellite images showing recent construction at a former uranium enrichment plant at Furat, one of several sites searched by U.N. inspectors.
"At the majority of these sites, the equipment and laboratories have deteriorated to such a degree that the resumption of nuclear activities would require substantial renovation," ElBaradei wrote in his report to the council.
ElBaradei said today that the findings did not prove that Iraq has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. He also faulted Baghdad for failing to provide more "proactive cooperation" that could shed light on Iraq's past weapons programs.
ElBaradei said that continued inspections offered the best chance of deterring Iraq from rebuilding its weapons programs. "We are not getting optimal cooperation," he said. "But still we are inching forward, and we still believe that barring something exceptional, we should be able in a few months to come to a conclusion on Iraq's nuclear weapons program."
Iraq was close to developing nuclear weapons before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. IAEA inspectors said they had destroyed all nuclear facilities and equipment, and removed all weapons material before the inspections ended in 1998.
President Bush raised the specter of a new Iraqi quest for nuclear weapons, telling U.N. delegates during his Sept. 12 address to the U.N. General Assembly that Iraq made "several attempts" to "buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon."
In addition to the U.S. assertion that Iraq had attempted to buy aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, U.S. and British intelligence have claimed that Iraq had tried to purchase low-grade uranium for processing into weapons-grade material from a source in Niger. Despite repeated requests for evidence, ElBaradei said "we haven't gotten anything specific. Niger denied it, Iraq denied it, and we haven't seen any contracts."
ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation into Iraqi efforts to acquire large quantities of the aluminum tubes between 2000 and 2002 suggested that they were destined for an Iraqi program to build 81mm artillery rockets. He said that further investigation is required to determine whether Iraq may have diverted the tubes to a nuclear weapons program.
"We know that these tubes . . . could be used for conventional rockets," he said. They "cannot be used directly for [uranium] enrichment." ElBaradei said that his inspectors would continue to investigate whether the tubes had been reworked for nuclear weapons use.
A13, Jan. 29, 2003
UN Finds No Proof of Nuclear Program IAEA Unable to Verify US Claims
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 28 -- The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said today that two months of inspections in Iraq and interviews with Iraqi officials have yielded no evidence to support Bush administration claims that Iraq is secretly trying to revive its nuclear weapons program.
ElBaradei said in an interview that "systematic" inspections of eight facilities linked by U.S. and British authorities to a possible nuclear weapons program have turned up no proof to support the claims. "I think we have ruled out . . . the buildings," he said. ElBaradei also cast doubts on U.S. claims that Iraq has sought to import uranium and high-strength aluminum tubes destined for a nuclear weapons program.
ElBaradei's remarks, combined with a relatively upbeat assessment of Iraq's cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors, delivered to the U.N. Security Council on Monday, have complicated Bush administration efforts to make a case for military action against Iraq. The remarks also increased pressure on the United States to provide inspection teams with more intelligence regarding Iraq's suspected nuclear weapons program.
The administration's concerns about Iraq's alleged intent to develop nuclear weapons formed the basis of the case President Bush made to the United Nations in September for disarming Iraq. Bush said in an Oct. 7 speech that satellite photographs revealed that "Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past." White House officials produced satellite images showing recent construction at a former uranium enrichment plant at Furat, one of several sites searched by U.N. inspectors.
"At the majority of these sites, the equipment and laboratories have deteriorated to such a degree that the resumption of nuclear activities would require substantial renovation," ElBaradei wrote in his report to the council.
ElBaradei said today that the findings did not prove that Iraq has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. He also faulted Baghdad for failing to provide more "proactive cooperation" that could shed light on Iraq's past weapons programs.
ElBaradei said that continued inspections offered the best chance of deterring Iraq from rebuilding its weapons programs. "We are not getting optimal cooperation," he said. "But still we are inching forward, and we still believe that barring something exceptional, we should be able in a few months to come to a conclusion on Iraq's nuclear weapons program."
Iraq was close to developing nuclear weapons before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. IAEA inspectors said they had destroyed all nuclear facilities and equipment, and removed all weapons material before the inspections ended in 1998.
President Bush raised the specter of a new Iraqi quest for nuclear weapons, telling U.N. delegates during his Sept. 12 address to the U.N. General Assembly that Iraq made "several attempts" to "buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon."
In addition to the U.S. assertion that Iraq had attempted to buy aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, U.S. and British intelligence have claimed that Iraq had tried to purchase low-grade uranium for processing into weapons-grade material from a source in Niger. Despite repeated requests for evidence, ElBaradei said "we haven't gotten anything specific. Niger denied it, Iraq denied it, and we haven't seen any contracts."
ElBaradei said that a preliminary investigation into Iraqi efforts to acquire large quantities of the aluminum tubes between 2000 and 2002 suggested that they were destined for an Iraqi program to build 81mm artillery rockets. He said that further investigation is required to determine whether Iraq may have diverted the tubes to a nuclear weapons program.
"We know that these tubes . . . could be used for conventional rockets," he said. They "cannot be used directly for [uranium] enrichment." ElBaradei said that his inspectors would continue to investigate whether the tubes had been reworked for nuclear weapons use.
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